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What is legislative 
turnover?
French elections 2017. Incumbents exiting
154 MPs returned 
(26,68%)
224 resigned 
(38,82%)
199 defeated
(34,48%)
Source: National Assembly 2017
Returning Did not stand for re-election Defeated
Assembly size = 577
423 incumbents exited
Legislative turnover = 
73,3% 
… and newcomers entering. New deputies in 
the French National Assembly 1946-2017
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Source: Gouglas, Maddens and Brans 2017
423 newcomers
Legislative turnover French National 
Assembly 1946-2017
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577 seats
423 newcomers entered
Legislative turnover = 73,3%
Why should we care?
A political elite seismometer
• “The governing elite is 
always in a state of slow 
and continuous 
transformation. It flows like 
a river, never being today 
what it was yesterday”
Wilfredo Pareto 1916 
“[elite composition] a 
seismometer for detecting 
shifts in the foundation of 
polities and politics’’ 
Robert Putnam 1976
• “Legislative turnover sets 
the upper limit of the 
transformation of the 
political elite”
Mogens Pedersen 2000
A democratic thermometer (Crowther and 
Matonyte 2007). Democratic convalescence 
and more…
Descriptive representation 
and low turnover
“an anchor keeping the polity 
from moving to a more 
representative body” 
Matland and Studlar (2004)
“arrogance, unresponsiveness 
and failure of competence” … 
“the dread disease of 
caesarism” 
Lawson (1993)
Strength of legislatures and 
high turnover
“high rates of turnover can 
potentially harm the 
functioning of the parliament 
among others by breeding 
short-termism and instability 
IPU (2012)
“shift power towards the 
executive branch”
Matland and Studlar (2004)
A policy barometer (Gouglas 2017)
• “a substantial influx of parliamentary ‘freshmen’ may 
introduce innovative policy ideas in parliament (Brunk & 
Mineheart, 1984)
• Although turnover “does not guarantee new policies”, it 
“makes them possible” (Brezinski and Huntington 1963)
An index of …
parliamentary 
institutionalization
• Polsby 1968
political opportunity
• Schlesinger 1966
How much turnover?
Kuklys (2013)
60%-80%?
Why Australia? My 
research at ANU-SPIR
Grant V437117N (FWO) 
Replication of my PhD work on turnover in 
Western Europe 1945-2015. Global dataset
PhD Questions
• What explains LT in WE 
lower chambers 1945-
2015?
• Do explanations differ by 
gender?
• How much turnover is 
there within and across 
political parties and why?
Australia
• What is the evolution of 
turnover in the Australian 
House of 
Representatives?
• What is the evolution of LT 
within parties?
• How can variability in 
turnover rates in the HoR
and parties be explained?
• [Gender?]
Legislative turnover at 
the assembly level
• What is the evolution of turnover 
trends in time?
• How can variability in turnover 
rates be explained? 
Legislative Turnover Trends: Australian House 
of Representatives 1946-2017
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1949 increase 
in assembly 
size & 
realignment to 
LIB
1969 reinstating 
election swing to 
ALP
1996 
realignment 
to LIB
1975 
realignment 
to LIB
1984 increase 
in assembly 
size & 
realignment to 
ALP 
1951 & 1954 
maintaining 
elections
1987 
maintaining 
election
Source: Gouglas, 
Maddens, Brans 
2017
Australia: 
24,8%
Source: Gouglas, Maddens, Brans 2017
Matland & Studlar (2004) 1974-1994
Legislative Turnover Trends: Australian House 
of Representatives 1946-2017
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1949 increase 
in assembly 
size & 
realignment to 
LIB
1969 reinstating 
election swing to 
ALP
1996 
realignment 
to LIB
1975 
realignment 
to LIB
1984 increase 
in assembly 
size & 
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maintaining 
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maintaining 
election
Supply & demand model of legislative 
turnover
Legislative turnover
Electorates 
(Demand)
Selectorates
(Demand)
Contenders 
(Supply)
Political & 
institutional 
context
Adapted from Norris 
1997, Best & Cotta 
2000
Aspirants
Candidates
Legislators
Factors explaining supply and demand
Structure of political 
career opportunities 
and the supply of 
contenders 
Party practices and 
the demand for 
candidates
Electoral 
realignments and 
the demand of 
voters for 
representatives
Electoral system 
supply and demand
Legislative 
turnover
LT WE 1945-2015 (Gouglas, Maddens, Brans 
2017)
Causes of turnover Australian House of 
Representatives 1949-2010, N= 25
Opportunities
Electoral 
alignments
Parties
R-square: 0,772
Adj.R-squ: 0,675
SDE: 6,66325
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MP remuneration to GNI per head Australian House of Representatives 1959-2016
Legislative turnover at 
the party level
• What is the evolution of turnover 
trends in time?
• How can variability in turnover 
rates be explained? 
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Australian Labour Party 1946-2017
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National Party

(some) causes of party MP turnover 1946-
2017, N=84 (out of 118)
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4,235 10,905  ,388 ,699 
Party strength 1,466 ,505 ,326 2,904 ,005 
Party age -,106 ,108 -,181 -,990 ,326 
Participation in previous government -11,563 3,429 -,354 -3,372 ,001 
Party division 6,461 6,767 ,102 ,955 ,343 
Gender quota 2,378 6,587 ,043 ,361 ,719 
Liberal Party -,569 5,954 -,016 -,096 ,924 
National Party -,877 4,675 -,025 -,188 ,852 
Effective number of parties (votes) 10,184 4,682 ,299 2,175 ,033 
Electoral system disproportionality ,145 ,691 ,022 ,210 ,835 
a. Dependent Variable: Party MP turnover 
 
R-square: 0,372
Adj.R-squ: 0,296
SDE: 13,74214
Next steps. Your ideas welcome!
• Collect the data for the 1901 – 1943 period
• Cross-validate all data with Patrick Leslie’s 
• Write a conference paper on Australia
• Examine if it is worth publishing a single case study on the 
basis of the Australian data 
• Examine the potential for a comparative study on turnover 
in Westminster systems i.e. UK, Canada, New Zealand, 
Ireland or in Transferable Vote systems i.e Ireland, Malta
Thank you!
